In this paper we analyze high-frequency movements in Swiss financial markets in reaction to real-time communication by the Swiss National Bank. Our analysis of central bank communication encompasses official speeches and interviews, not only monetary policy announcements. We examine the reactions of the currency market, the bond market and the stock exchange. The evidence suggests that speeches and interviews, along with monetary policy announcements, engender a significant price reaction. This paper sheds light on the relevance of communications other than monetary policy announcements. A particular line of research on macroeconomic news and financial assets, to which our paper contributes, focuses on information emanating from central banks. For instance, Bell and Windle (2005) and Reeves and Sawicki (2005) looked into the reaction of sterling interest rates to Bank of England communication. Jansen and De Haan (2005) studied the reaction of euro-dollar exchange rates to statements by the European Central Bank and national central bank officials. Kohn and Sack (2004) investigated the response of various U.S. financial variables to FOMC statements accompanying interest rate decisions and to former chairman Greenspan's testimony to Congress. Bomfim (2003) studied the influence of FED announcements on the U.S. stock market.
Introduction
Communication by central banks has attracted considerable attention in the last few years.
It is seen as instrumental in achieving transparency and a high degree of accountability.
Moreover, by communicating their intentions, central banks affect the expectations of financial market participants and financial assets and thus increase the effectiveness of monetary policy (Blinder, 1998; Woodford, 2003; Bernanke, 2004) . Ideally, monetary policy is able to respond less aggressively than would otherwise have been necessary.
Despite its relevance, relatively little research has been done into the effects of central bank communication. This paper contributes to this literature by analyzing whether communication by Swiss National Bank (SNB) management affects Swiss asset markets using high-frequency data. The paper goes beyond previous studies in three important respects.
First, it not only investigates the reactions of asset markets to official policy announcements but also to speeches and interviews. Second, it analyzes the reaction of three financial assets: currency rates, stocks and bonds. Third, it provides a new database derived from internal SNB information and external newswire reports.
The paper's findings are that SNB communication does indeed affect asset markets. They react not only to official policy statements but also to speeches and interviews. Market participants actively monitor and promptly respond to central bank communication. While official policy announcements cannot be used in a discretionary way, speeches and interviews allow the monetary authorities to flexibly inform market participants about past and ongoing economic activity as well as about impending policy. The policy conclusions of this paper are that communication tools may be seen as additional policy instruments which, however, have to be handled with circumspection. This paper's conclusion is partially at odds with Reeves and Sawicki (2005) who found that in the UK, speeches and testimony to parliamentary committees are less informative than the Bank of England's Minutes and Inflation Report. The Swiss case also contrasts with Kohn and Sack (2004) who found a significant response in interest rate expectations to the Federal Open Market Committee and to Chairman Greenspan's testimony to Congress, but no reaction to ordinary speeches -the most comparable form of communication across countries.
After reviewing the existing literature and related research, this paper describes the SNB's monetary policy concept and its communication instruments. Next, it presents the empirical framework used to estimate the short-term effects of communication on selected Swiss asset prices, followed by a description of the data. Then, the results are shown. The final section presents conclusions.
Literature survey
The burgeoning body of literature on central bank communication and transparency can be parsed into different categories. On the one hand there is a good deal of theoretical work covering the welfare implications associated with central bank transparency. No consensus on whether higher central bank transparency is generally beneficial has emerged (yet). 1 On the other, a fast expanding empirical literature hints at overall positive effects of transparency. The empirical research has tackled the issue from different angles.
One broad research area emphasizes the macroeconomic implications of varying degrees of central bank transparency and communication. For instance, Chortareas et al. (2002) document a decrease in inflation following increased central bank transparency in a large country-sample. Van der Cruijsen and Demertzis (2005) found that the sensitivity of private sector inflation expectations to past inflation has diminished against the backdrop of greater transparency. Geraats et al. (2006) report an increase in policy flexibility and a decrease in inflation expectations. A related group of empirical contributions encompasses studies focusing on communication strategies (Blinder et al., 2001; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2005a; Blinder, 2006a) .
Another investigative approach concentrates on the effects of macroeconomic news releases or, more specifically, of central bank communication on financial markets. One research issue is whether there is a link between transparency and monetary policy predictability. The evidence for transparency increasing monetary policy predictability seems compelling. See, among others, Gerlach-Kristen (2004) , Kohn and Sack (2004) , Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004; 2005b , 2005c , Wilhelmsen and Zaghini (2005) , and Swanson (2006) .
A further line of research, and the one adopted in this paper, focuses on the role of macroeconomic and public news announcements as a source of financial market reactions.
The vast literature on macro announcements offers ample evidence that macroeconomic news affect asset prices. The contributions can be broadly categorized according to the market researched. One focal point of literature linking macroeconomic news and the variation of securities prices is the foreign exchange market. A selection of papers includes Andersen et al. (2003) , Fratzscher (2004) , and Jansen and de Haan (2005) . Another focus of research is bond market reactions, researched, for instance, by Cook and Hahn (1989) , 1 See, for instance, Geraats (2002), Woodford (2005) , and Jordan and Rossi (2006) for recent overviews.
Governing Board at the quarterly monetary policy assessment. If necessary, the Board may change the target range at short notice between regular meetings, giving rise to what we term "unscheduled decisions".
Although the SNB has a decades-long history of regular explanation of its monetary policy decisions to market participants and the public, it has steadily refined its communication policies and substantially increased its transparency. 5 In order to communicate its current assessment of economic developments and its thinking about future policy decisions, today's SNB resorts to a broad set of communication tools. First and foremost, a detailed press release -comprising i) assumptions for the global economy, ii) a comprehensive appraisal of domestic economic activity and its outlook, iii) an evaluation of monetary developments, iv) inflation perspectives based on ii) and iii) and the explanation of the monetary policy decision, v) the target range for the Libor and the envisaged interest rate within this band and vi) an inflation forecast based on the assumption that the new decided Libor will remain constant over the forecasting period of three years -is made available immediately after the quarterly monetary policy assessment. Great emphasis is laid upon the reasoning behind each decision, which is explained irrespective of whether policy settings have been changed or not. In the June and December assessments this information is delivered at a press conference.
A few weeks later, the SNB publishes a Monetary Policy Report. In it, the SNB issues statements on the development of the principal indicators that were taken into account, describes the latest monetary and economic developments, conveys its views on the economic situation and explains the inflation forecast more thoroughly. Moreover, the SNB submits an annual accountability report to the Federal Assembly in which it explains in detail how it has fulfilled its statutory mandate, in particular the conduct of monetary policy, and also describes the economic and monetary developments in the year under review. In addition, the Chairman of the Governing Board testifies before parliamentary commissions. Further means of communication include speeches and interviews delivered by the Governing Board and other senior officials in which supplementary information on Swiss monetary policy is offered. In this paper we will analyze the market impact of monetary policy decisions, speeches and interviews. 6 3. Estimation procedure
Non-parametric event study
Event studies can in principle be carried out by means of parametric or non-parametric methods. Parametric event studies make specific assumptions regarding market models and distribution of excess returns. Ever since Cook and Hahn's early (1989) paper assessing markets' reaction to monetary policy actions embedded in a parametric event study, numerous researchers have adopted and refined this approach. Critical in these studies is the correct measurement of policy surprises. A variety of different techniques and financial instruments have been employed to model the surprise component of an announcement. 6 We have opted for a non-parametric analysis, which has several advantages. By choosing a non-parametric procedure, we can overcome the difficulties of replicating the surprise of monetary policy communication. Second, non-parametric event study approaches are free of specific assumptions regarding return distribution and price formation behaviour in the market in question. Third, a key advantage of our event study approach is that it avoids having to classify communication. Unlike much of the literature, we can thus circumvent the danger of misclassifying statements and their intended content. Fourth, this approach allows us to analyze communication impacts event by event. We estimate the statistical significance of price impacts surrounding communication events by means of t-statistics.
We refer to two-tail statistics for the inequality between the price changes related to a specific event and the mean overall returns (inequality hypothesis). Note that we perform the two-sample equal variance (homoscedastic) test. This represents a more stringent test than the heteroscedastic hypothesis. Also, we calculate the mean overall return of the statistical population rather than the return during non-communication periods only. Both aspects give the probability associated with a Student's t-test for equality in means an upward bias and lead to a more likely rejection of the inequality hypothesis. The standard errors for the t-test are based on the population's standard deviation. We also considered a more contingent and time-variable definition of standard deviation. For instance, we have considered the return standard deviation at the same time of day as each specific event occurred. This allows us to take into account some effects due to intraday seasonalities. We have also conditioned return variability on the recent past by considering the last 8, 26 or 52 weeks. Our findings remain essentially unchanged. 6 Rigobon and Sack (2006) argue that the event study estimates suffer from a significant shortcoming due to mismeasurement of the macroeconomic news so that the measured data surprises explain only a small portion of the variation in asset prices and monetary policy expectations. They propose two new approaches to better account for the noise in measured data surprises. Using these estimators they find that incoming news generally has a much bigger impact on asset prices than captured by the event study approach.
We also attempt to analyze the statistical impact related to a specific communication tool.
To this end, we employ non-parametric measures comparing the price impacts related to a given communication instrument and the overall price changes. Specifically, we examine whether the mean, median and variance of intraday returns clustered around communication events are likely to be equal to those of the population. The non-parametric tests shown in the tables are the Anova F-test, the Median Chi-square test and the Variance F-test. Other methodologies for the mean, median and variance test have been considered. 7 These additional measures -not reported in the paper -are supportive of its results.
To ease the reading of our results, we organised the tables as follows. First, we present the reaction asset by asset, starting with the forex, followed by equities and finally bonds.
Second, each table exhibits significant event-specific and communication-specific results.
Accordingly, we report intraday price impacts on an event-by-event basis (size of price impact and related t-test), followed by the overall impact of each communication tool measured by the Anova F-test, the Median Chi-square and the Variance F-test. Third, for each market we looked at the three communication events in the following order: monetary policy announcements, official speeches, and interviews. We began by investigating scheduled and unscheduled policy announcements separately. In so doing, we calculated statistical tests comprising all monetary policy announcements, a subsample including only the scheduled events, i.e. scheduled monetary policy announcements and Ordinary General Meetings of Shareholders and bank authorities, and finally scheduled monetary policy assessments only. This allowed us to infer whether the market reacted to both scheduled and unscheduled monetary policy announcements. Finally, we considered interviews and speeches reported either during working hours or out of business hours or for which it was not possible to establish the exact intraday time. To opportunely report these information releases, we organized the tables on speeches and interviews into two panels. As explained below in more detail, the upper panel shows the intraday effect within trading hours. The lower panel illustrates the daily effect of off-market news.
Although knowledge of whether the market response corresponded with policymakers' intentions would constitute an (additional) important insight from a policymaking point of view, our analysis is limited to the description of the market reactions. We refrained from any normative interpretation of the results. 8
Sampling interval
While earlier papers on asset price movements used monthly or even quarterly data, event study literature employs daily data. However, even this seems insufficient. First, earlier work has shown that the average effect of announcements is felt very quickly. 8 The use of daily data, including the effect of announcements and all other information impacting the market that day, leads to very imprecise estimates of the announcements' effects, especially on highly variable asset prices, such as foreign exchange. For instance, attempts to identify systematic relationships between the surprise component of macroeconomic data releases and one-day exchange rate changes have not been successful, as shown by Hardouvelis (1988) and Edison (1997) .
To mitigate these problems, higher-frequency data which shrinks the time period around the policy decisions has been used in more recent work. High-frequency, intraday data exhibits two appealing characteristics: First, by narrowing time windows around a specific event, it becomes much less likely that any other cause can mistakenly be identified as having determined market reactions. Second, estimations are more efficient in terms of identification and evaluation of single outliers.
Thanks to data availability, the more recent contributions to the literature make use of intradaily data. 9 Thus, in order to characterise the response of asset markets more accurately, we also use intraday data coupled with the exact time of an SNB announcement.
While most of the previous literature on intraday event study confines the analysis to a short period of time, we also compare the reaction of financial markets over different event windows varying according to the form of communication. The shortest time window we allow for is 5 minutes, the longest includes a 24-hour window following the arrival of information from monetary policymakers, excluding overnight movements.
Sample period
Another feature of previous research into asset price movements over short windows of time around announcements is its customary restriction to a short sample period for lack of intradaily data over long spans. 10 We agree with Faust et al. (2003) that using a long time 8 Balduzzi et al. (2001) describe this phenomenon for the bond markets and Andersen et al. (2003) for the forex markets. 9 Moving from daily to intradaily frequency may affect the outcomes significantly. For instance, Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005b) span is appealing, and stress the benefits of high-frequency data. A longer series of high frequency data contributes to the precision of estimates and allows for the exploration of the possibility that the effects of announcements on asset prices may vary over time. We focus our attention on the period beginning with the implementation of the SNB's new monetary policy framework, thus including information from January 2000 to December 2005. While the market impact of communication under two different monetary policy regimes would constitute an interesting line of research, lack of sufficient observations during the monetary targeting time frame creates an insurmountable barrier to empirical examination. Hence, given that monetary policy decisions are taken quarterly, our sample of policy announcements is relatively short. It does nonetheless incorporate a period featuring interest rate increases, a period with historically low interest rates, a bull and bear equity market and a series of significant shocks to the economy, including the impact of 9/11 and a sharp rise in oil prices.
Methodological limits
There are at least four methodological limits to point out. First, the accuracy of the results depends significantly on the extent of broadcasting systems information taken into account and the precision with which their reports are captured. Given that it is impossible to track all broadcasting systems, one methodological limit to our analysis is that it is restricted to three leading newswire companies: Dow Jones Newswires, Reuters and Bloomberg. However, there are many others which may report on communication events by the SNB, such as AWP (AG für Wirtschafts-Publikationen), SDA (Schweizerische Depeschenagentur AG), etc.
A second limit refers to the precision with which the event time can be time-stamped.
Several issues come into play here. While the actual time of a monetary policy announcement can be precisely identified, there may be a mismatch between a speech or interview and the time of a related news release. On the one hand, a speech may be given ahead of the official time, followed by a waiting period (also called "embargo"). Thus, information may become publicly available before the official embargo elapses. As a result of these methodological constraints we may find market movements ahead of the reporting time of news broadcasts tracked in this study. When it comes to interviews, it is possible that SNB-related information circulates among market participants prior to newswire reporting. The reason is that unlike speeches, the dates of interviews are not always publicly available in advance. Occasionally, broadcasting companies call up the SNB's press office to check the content of an interview before reporting on it. Information may therefore already be in circulation when the first newswire appears. Early market fluctuations (prior to the first newswire release) are thus possible. A related limit is linked to the intraday time windows, set to 5 minutes. This 5 minute rule means that all events must be rounded up or down to the nearest 5-minute time interval, even if an event was reported in between. 11
Third, even if we observe significant price movements surrounding SNB communications, we cannot exclude that these are due to other causes. We distinguish two possible biases. First, although the intraday analysis enhances the measurement precision of the event impact, many other occurrences that we did not control for can significantly affect asset prices. For example, it is difficult to infer whether speeches and interviews reported in the wake of 9/11 had a genuine market impact. To account for this possible bias, we also report price movements the day before and after the SNB communication event. Second, there may be overlapping SNB communication events that have to be taken into account. If overlapping communication events occurred, we reported them in footnotes to each table. Some of them explain apparent early price movements.
Fourth, by using high-frequency data we attempted to nail down the effects of SNB communication on financial markets distinct from other news. We grouped the intraday data within successive time windows, thus extending the observation period. Given that we did not focus exclusively on market behaviour narrowly confined around communication events, we cannot exclude that the genuine market reaction to SNB communication is being offset by other news, producing a price reversal. Therefore, we cannot rule out that other incoming news may make a significant communication event ineffective over a longer timeframe.
Data and summary statistics
This section describes the data used in the empirical analysis. We study the impact of SNB communication using high-frequency intraday data on the CHF/USD, the Swiss Bond Index (SBI) and, as the measure of the stock exchange, the Swiss Performance Index (SPI).
Observations run from January 2000 to December 2005. As pointed out above, the beginning of the sample is dictated by the onset of the new monetary policy concept adopted by the SNB. Data on the CHF/USD rate was kindly provided to us by the Swiss-Systematic Asset Management SA, Zurich. The data on both the SBI and SPI were placed at our disposal by the SWX Swiss Exchange. 12 Furthermore, we use daily data, obtained from Datastream, measured at one p.m. GMT time. In order to capture the surprise elements of communication we relied on the movements of the Futures written on the three-month Libor in a 20-minute window following an SNB announcement. These data are from the SNB. 13 The data contain information on transaction prices and the related time stamp to the nearest second of all index changes or representative forex quotes that occurred in our sample period. The data set has been organised into 5-minute time intervals. If no trades occurred in a given 5-minute interval, we copied down the price from the previous time interval. We carefully checked the presence of outliers and all other data properties. Indeed, we encountered irregular records for the SBI from 28/11/2002 to 7/11/2003. The SWX confirmed that this was due to a calculation problem in bond coupon values. For that reason, we excluded this period from the bond analysis. 14 As described in Section 2, the SNB engages in intensive communication activities. We focus on three forms: speeches as well as interviews (both by members of the Enlarged Governing Board) and monetary policy announcements by the Governing Board, both scheduled and unscheduled. Incidentally, these communication forms exhibit a methodological advantage as their dates are -apart from the few unscheduled assessments -published well in advance, so that no endogeneity problem found in the literature on central bank communication blurs our results. 15 For the sake of completeness and extension of observations in the sample we added the remarks of the Chairman of the Board made during the Ordinary General Meeting. The General Meeting is held once a year, as a rule in April. 16 The communication sample had to be constructed from scratch. To this end, we first fell back on an unpublished daily report drawn up by the SNB's press office that provides coverage of highlights reported by the media. From these publications we selected all articles referring to SNB speeches, interviews and monetary policy decisions. Once our sample of speeches was constructed, we compared it with the SNB's in-house statistics. By contrast, our sample of interviews contains only those covered by the media. Speeches and interviews were included irrespective of their content. If we simultaneously came across newswire reports alluding to SNB spokesmen 13 We are grateful to Marcel Zimmermann (SNB). 14 Unfortunately, all other relevant indices on Swiss bonds provided by the SWX are also affected by this problem. Moreover, SWX does not plan to recalculate these intraday data. Therefore, it is impossible to find a better alternative to the total bond index. 15 Our database also contains communications by SNB spokesmen in which an endogeneity problem may arise, as spokesmen interventions may occur in reaction to particular market conditions. However, spokesmen communication represents only 16% of interviews -too few to affect the results significantly. 16 Owing to the SNB's public mandate, the powers of the Shareholders' Meeting are limited compared with joint-stock companies under private law. comments, we added them to our database. The collected information was then used to do a search of pertinent references in Bloomberg, Dow Jones and Reuters. For the information provided by Dow Jones and Reuters we recurred to Factiva®, from Dow Jones, entering several keywords, such as "Swiss National Bank", "SNB", "Monetary policy", the name of speaker or interviewee and others. Newswire services' information is particularly useful since they provide a time stamp of the news release to the nearest minute, enabling us to arrange precise intraday time windows around the earliest newswire report. The issuance time of the monetary policy announcements was provided by the SNB's press office. 17 Eventually, we complemented our data set with reports on the traditional year-end meetings of the Chairman of the Board with the cabinet and with information relating to elections and resignations of the Enlarged Governing Board members. Although it comprises a good deal of information, we did not consider the quarterly Monetary Policy Report for it is not available until nearly four weeks (internet) and five weeks (hardcopy) after the latest monetary policy assessment. 18 Nor is there any accompanying press conference on its publication day. 19 Neither did we take into account the testimonies to the parliamentary commissions delivered by the Chairman of the Governing Board. Though an important part of the SNB's accountability, they received no particular media attention. 20 Note also that no Minutes of the monetary policy meetings are made publicly available. 21 Table 1 offers an overview of the three communication forms at issue in this study, 17 We are deeply indebted to Roland Baumann. 18 The time lag is largely attributable to the long translation process required for the simultaneous release in German, French and English. 19 In terms of importance the SNB's Monetary Policy Report is not comparable with, e.g., the Inflation Report by the Bank of England's MPC whose publication is accompanied by an hour-long press conference with three senior bank officials. 20 In any case, only a few data points would be available, for the Chairman of the Governing Board has only been required to testify before the parliamentary commission since the enactment of the new National Bank Act in May 2004. 21 Normally, the SNB opens its internal records only after 30 years (Rich, 2003, fn. 6) . The rationale for abstaining from publishing the Minutes is discussed, e.g., in Jordan and Rossi (2007). Overall, the target range for the three-month Libor or its level was changed fourteen times.
Half of the interest rate moves were decided on at regularly scheduled policy meetings. The size of interest rate steps announced at regular meetings varies from 25 bp to 75 bp. Since interest rates were increased in the first two unscheduled meetings, they were cut in all other instances. More accurately, while the target range was kept unchanged at the first decision announced outside the regular calendar, the target for the 3-month Libor was 14 moved from the middle to the upper part of the range. At the second unscheduled decision the target range was raised by 50 bp while the target for the Libor was kept unchanged in the middle section of the range. The two rate cuts decided at inter-meeting dates in September 2001 were called for in the aftermath of 9/11. 22
From the table we can infer very few policy reversals. Using Blinder's (2006b) definition that a policy reversal is a change in direction within three months, we count only one policy reversal. Widening the window to four months adds one more reversal. Not only this apparent aversion to policy reversals is in line with other central banks but also the preference for gradualism. According to Blinder (2006b, p. 32) , the share of rate changes of 25 bp or less was 79% for the Fed, 88% for the BoE, and 89% for the Riksbank. At the SNB, since inception of the new monetary policy concept the share of rate changes of 25 bp or less was 73% while the share of rate changes of 50 bp amounted to 23%. 23 
Market reaction to SNB communication
Although the event study literature has provided a number of insights about the effects of macroeconomic data releases on monetary policy expectations and asset prices, the 22 The first of the two rate cuts was announced three days ahead of the regular assessment in a coordinated effort with the FED and the ECB to dampen market uncertainty. 23 If we consider only the decisions that implied a change in the mid-point target interest rate, then 50% of policy moves involved a step of 50 bp; the share of policy moves of 25 bp reduces to 43%. 24 For lack of data, the surprise component of the first two communications contained in Table 1 was captured by the changing of the three-month Libor with respect to the previous day. estimated effects have in general been found to be relatively small. This has been demonstrated even for those assets that are reckoned to be very sensitive to near term monetary policy expectations. Independent of reaction size, the qualitative findings are revealing. One result obtained from high-frequency data is that price adjustments to announcements generally occur within one to twenty minutes after the event.
In this section we examine the impact of different communication tools employed by the SNB on three distinct financial markets. In subsection 1 we analyze the response of the CHF/USD exchange rate. Subsection 2 looks into the stock exchange and subsection 3 deals with the bond market.
The SNB has long been concerned that it be understood by market participants and the public. Clear and honest communication is a prerequisite for transparency. A transparent information framework may be achieved by timely and thorough communication and explanation of the policy decisions which, as a rule, are taken on a quarterly basis at the monetary policy assessments. As follows from Table 1 , the SNB has also made extensive use of speeches and interviews to promulgate its views between official policy decision meetings. Additional tools of communication may improve the regularity and frequency of information flow and thus enhance central bank transparency. Based on this reasoning, we first investigated whether monetary policy decisions affected financial markets. We then analyzed whether financial markets reacted to interviews and speeches. If so, they can be seen as conveying additional information to market participants. Used effectively, they can, among other things, improve the SNB's transparency, allowing financial markets to better anticipate the monetary policy decisions well in advance of the scheduled day. As a corollary, the effect on asset yields may be visible ahead of a monetary policy announcement, leaving the markets less affected on the day of a scheduled decision. 25 If, conversely, significant reactions occur only at the time of regular and pre-announced monetary policy assessments, interviews and speeches would not appear to convey significant information regarding monetary policy. 26 We constructed six time windows. The first time window captures exchange rate movements 15 minutes ahead of an announcement while the second window covers the reaction in the 5 minutes immediately following an announcement. The third window covers the market's behaviour from 5 to 15 minutes after a communication event. In the remaining three time windows the interval is widened to 15 minutes, i.e. from 15 to 30 minutes, from 30 to 45 minutes and from 45 to 60 minutes after an announcement. Note that in the analysis we can only cover six (of the seven) unscheduled monetary policy announcements, because the 50 bp drop in the interest rate target decided At the bottom of Table 3 .1 we present three tests covering the mean, the median and the variance of market reactions. They indicate whether an official interest rate announcement per se had a significant impact on the forex market. The tests show that monetary policy announcements had a strong effect in terms of mean, median and variance of asset prices.
Effect on exchange rates
The results suggest that monetary policy decisions affected the CHF/USD within 15 minutes of an announcement, although some effect is still observable after 15 to 30 minutes. As shown in the last three rows of Table 3 .1, these effects remain strong even after considering scheduled announcements only. in which a significant speech was recorded. Entries in columns two to six are based on intraday data. The last three columns display the outcomes obtained using daily data. The second column shows the market movements 30 minutes before the earliest newswire report, followed by the market development in the next 30 minutes, then the interval between 30 and 60 minutes and then between 60 and 120 minutes. The fourth to last column indicates the results in the 24 hours following the first newswire report linked to a speech by an SNB official. The final three columns reflect the market behaviour on the day preceding the interview, the day of, and the day after. This allows us to compare the results obtained with the higher frequency intraday data and to infer whether other causes could have triggered the significant price movements we found. Daily data refer to values at one p.m. (GMT time). The table is broken into panels corresponding to whether a related newswire report was released within (Panel A) or out of (Panel B) trading hours.
As can be gleaned from Panel A, we recorded a significant impact on the currency 18 times (out of 68, see Table 1 ) (26%). Some movement occurred between 30 minutes proceeding and 30 minutes following the first related newswire report. As mentioned above, price fluctuations before news arrivals are not to be taken as a sign of informed trading. Among the main reasons for early price movements considered in this study are overlapping events, deficient tracking of broadcasters, imprecise identification of event time, other informational events, and so on. After time-stamping each speech that affected the market we checked the preceding day for significant market movement and found nothing, thus corroborating our results. However, as shown in the last three rows of Panel A, speeches do not have a particular impact on the CHF/USD rate when compared with all other observations included in the sample.
The entries in Panel B refer to speeches that were reported by newswire systems outside of trading hours. We recurred to daily data to capture the market impact at three different points in time, i.e. the day preceding the publication of an interview, the day coinciding with its publication and the day after. From a total of 78 speeches, 12 were found significant on any one of these days. We found a significant impact on the day a speech was given seven times. As can be inferred from the Anova F-statistic and the Variance Ftest, these speeches did affect the return mean and variance of the CHF/USD on communication days.
18 Table 3.2 ABOUT HERE   Table 3 .3 summarizes the significant reactions of the CHF/USD rate to SNB interviews.
According to Panel A, 16 interviews (from a total of 54, see Table 1 ) were significant at intraday frequency (30%). Similar to speeches, interviews mostly affected the CHF/USD rate in the first two time windows. On six occasions we found significant market movement 30 minutes ahead of a related newswire report. Likewise, a significant reaction occurred six times in the 30 minutes following an interview. In three cases there was market fluctuation in the pre-and the post 30-minute interval. In contrast to speeches, the currency market also reacted five times with a delay of one to two hours. This lasting impact of interviews may be due to the fact that this form of communication contains variegated and wideranging contents, whose reading and assimilation can be more time-consuming.
It is also noticeable that the forex market was not subject to significant fluctuations on days prior to an interview. Moreover, given that no lasting impact is detectable on the days when the interviews were reported by newswire systems but is mostly concentrated in one of the time windows, we conclude that the significant effects we found are genuinely linked to the interviews and not attributable to other events taking place beforehand. Both these and the results found for speeches uphold our findings. As follows from the last rows of Panel A, interviews do seem to cause market participants to react differently than on other days, 30 to 60 minutes following related newswire reporting. In particular, the variance of the CHF/USD rate increases. The sample statistics show that interviews have some overall significant effect on the forex market. See in particular the Variance F-test. Meetings triggered no reaction. Third, the equity market seems to need more time to absorb news related to monetary policy decisions than the foreign currency market. Most of the significant reactions occur within 30 minutes but in some circumstances 45 minutes are necessary. This may be interpreted as a slow price reaction, but it could also be for technical reasons. In particular, we are measuring the equity market reaction by means of the SPI index that includes all equity market capitalisations quoted at the SWX. Thus, the protracted market adjustment may stem from the most illiquid stocks. Fourth, the significant market movement was mostly downward. Fifth, as can be deduced from the statistical tests reported at the end of the table, monetary policy announcements do not appear to influence the stock market differently from other days' news, apart from an increase in the variance of equity prices in the minutes preceding and following an announcement. Panel A, 20 speeches were significant at intraday frequency (29%). Panel A makes at least two interesting points. First, speeches affect equity prices significantly. This is especially observable in terms of the Variance F-test. Second, a cluster of significant effects is identifiable in the first half of the sample. On two occasions we found a significant market effect both the day before and in the half hour before and the half hour after a speech. This observation suggests that the market was subject to large fluctuations that were not associated with SNB communication but rather with exogenous events. Another point worth 20 stressing is the incidence of some market rebounds taking place between the first time window (30 minutes before a speech) and subsequent intraday time windows. By way of example, the equity market switched from a positive price movement half an hour before a speech of 17 September 2001 to a negative reaction in the half hour following it. From the last row of Panel A we can infer that official SNB speeches had a distinct impact on the variance of stock prices directly prior to their reporting by newswire services, and in the two hours following reporting, in comparison with the whole sample of observations. As can be seen in Panel B, we found significant market movement coinciding with SNB interview-related newswire system reports outside of working hours on 10 occasions (out of 86). In keeping with the findings outlined in Panel A, there were clearly fewer market reactions at the beginning and at the end of the sample. Furthermore, the market reacted consistently positively to this form of SNB communication in 2003. Finally, interviews triggered an increase in equities' variance different from other trading days. As already noted in Table 4 .1 and 4.2, the variance impact was also remarkable for monetary policy decisions and speeches. We conclude from these observations that SNB communication tends to have a greater impact on the second moment of equities' return distribution than on the first moment, a finding that may be interpreted as proof of the heterogeneity in market participants' expectations of risk premia. 
Effects on bonds
When comparing the effect of announcements on the bond market with the other two markets examined in the preceding subsections, it must be noted that the number of observations pertinent to monetary policy announcements available diminishes from 35 to 29. As explained above, this is due to data unavailability for Swiss bond indices for the period 28 November 2002 to 7 November 2003. Thus we have to make do with 19 scheduled announcements, 5 unscheduled announcements and 5 General Meetings.
Table 5.1 clearly shows that, of all assets, bonds are the most sensitive to monetary policy decisions -in line with previous rankings among financial assets suggested in the literature. 28 This is documented by all the sample tests, supporting the idea of a close link between monetary policy and the bond discount factor that ultimately determines bond values.
Several additional results emerge from Table 5 .1. First, not only monetary policy announcements, of which 8 were scheduled and 3 unscheduled but also -in contrast to the other two markets -addresses at the General Meetings, had 3 times as statistically significant effect on bond prices. Second, in contrast to the CHF/USD rate and the stock exchange, the effect of the Swiss monetary authorities is concentrated in the last period of this sample, beginning with the Board's resolution to abandon its expansionary policy course. 29 Third, bonds reacted to policy decisions with a lag varying from 5 to 30 minutes.
In most cases the responses were unidirectional, mainly downward. However, the announcements of the last two monetary policy meetings covered in this paper (15 September and 12 December 2005) were accompanied by an upward movement in bond prices. Finally, judged by all three statistical tests conducted, monetary policy announcements exerted a particular influence on bond prices, ascertainable in the first 30 minutes after the event, distinguishable from other days. minutes following a connected report. On three occasions we note a significant fluctuation both 30 minutes prior to and 30 minutes subsequent to a newswire. Only once (7 December 2005) did we detect a significant market movement the preceding day as well as a significant fluctuation in the bond market 30 minutes ahead of a speech.
In order to gauge the reaction of bonds to speeches given during business hours, we examined the market on the day preceding a speech, the day of, and the day after (Panel B). Thirteen speeches coincided with a significant market reaction on one of these days.
While the market's reaction the following day was positive until mid-June 2003, it has been negative since. Table 5 .3 lists all interviews that significantly affected the bond market. According to Panel A, 31 interviews (57%) went hand in hand with a significant market reaction in one of the time windows considered -ranging from 30 minutes ahead of the first newswire report to 24 hours after it. On six occasions we detected a movement that preceded a newswire report related to an SNB interview. The bulk, exhibiting a negative market impact, is clustered around September 2002 and February 2003. Interestingly, the market displays only a few 23 significant reactions in the 30-60 minute window. Rather, bonds tended to react either with a delay of 30 minutes or with a lag of one to two hours. Similar to speeches, interviews often have a drawn-out effect noticeable even 24 hours following the communication. On four different occasions, bonds fluctuated significantly on the day prior to the publication of an SNB interview that had a significant effect on the bond market the subsequent day.
However, in none of these cases was there a significant market fluctuation in the 30 minute window before the interview was reported by the newswire systems. From this we conclude that the market was genuinely reacting to newswire reports about an SNB interview rather than to another, previous event. Significant market movements ahead of a newswire report are hardly attributable to interviews, given that neither their time nor date is public knowledge. From the statistical tests presented at the bottom of Panel A, we deduce that bonds in particular respond to SNB interviews with increasing variance and with a delay of thirty minutes. 
Regression analysis
The non-parametric approach employed so far allows us to infer the frequency with which central bank communication affects the financial markets. In this section we complement our analysis with a parametric test that summarizes the analysis and allows us to check the robustness of the results. Following Kohn and Sack (2004) , we estimated the following regression equation: 
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The results are reported in Table 5 .4. The results for the coefficient β, which represents the monetary policy surprise, are reported in the second column. The sign of the coefficient is as expected (with one exception). An (unexpected) interest rate increase tends to strengthen the Swiss franc to the US dollar while it negatively affects stock and bond market value. All three communication forms analyzed in this paper exhibit estimated βcoefficients that are only weakly significant in statistical terms. By this measure, the strongest reaction is perceptible in the bond market and the weakest in the equity market where only announcements exhibit a statistically significant coefficient. The last column shows what we call the "variance ratio". It represents the ratio of the variance of the error Third, a novel contribution of this paper to the literature is that speeches and interviews by central bank officials also affect asset markets. This empirical evidence suggests that market participants are receptive to central bank information. In general, interviews seem to influence the financial markets more than speeches. While the effects on the currency market were relatively modest, both communication forms tended to strongly affect the bond market. Interviews also had a perceptible impact on the stock market.
Fourth, of all the markets, the bond market is clearly the most responsive to all three communication tools considered in this paper. While the sensitivity of bonds to monetary policy announcements has been documented in the literature, we report evidence that bonds in particular also respond significantly to speeches and interviews. Equities display the least reaction of all three markets. One explanation resides in the factors determining the discounted value of these assets. By simply splitting the discount factor into three main components, we can interpret the value drivers as the real interest rate, expected inflation and risk premia. Bonds appear to manifest the closest link with monetary policy since two of the three main ingredients making up the bond discount factor (i.e. real interest rates and expected inflation) largely depend on central bank decisions. Exchange rates are essentially valued in terms of economic fundamentals that, in turn, significantly depend on monetary policy too. On the other hand, discounted equity values may be largely influenced by risk premia. Also, dividend and cash-flow streams are more influenced by corporatespecific issues than monetary policy decisions. This should also explain why equity prices reveal less sensitivity to central bank communication than bonds and exchange rates.
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Fifth, our analysis shows the typical patterns and timing of communication impacts. The strongest effect of policy announcements on the foreign exchange market crops up within 15 minutes. Bonds react within 30 minutes, but mostly between 5 and 15 minutes. Equities are the most sluggish, reacting with a delay of up to 60 minutes. Reactions to speeches and interviews last longer on all three markets and are more difficult to situate. This may be due to technical aspects such as index construction including less liquid assets or the more time-consuming analysis required, in contrast to interest rate decisions. It is also possible that a protracted re-valuation process elicited by monetary policy news is a sign of market participants' heterogeneity. The fact that a price reaction is still visible one or two hours after a news release may also be due to more passive traders. Another plausible explanation for sluggish market responses is that there are many information sources available and that the same news provider may release information updates related to the original news item.
Given the possibility that broadcasters release the same news items in a non-synchronised way and/or quote each other within a short period of time, multiple information sources may translate into a longer-lasting impact of news items.
Sixth, as far as speeches and interviews are concerned, we perceive immediate and occasionally even premature market fluctuations with respect to newswire reports. This may be due to the limited number of newswire broadcasters covered in our analysis. By the same token, this could also be traced to the presence of traders actively monitoring and promptly reacting to information flows. A further explanation could be found in the methodological limitations of our event study setup.
Finally, while at the beginning of the sample period it was the currency market that responded most aggressively to SNB communication, in the later period it was the bond market. Monetary policy was continuously loosened from 2001 to 2003, evidenced by a reduction in the three-month Libor from 3.25% to a trough of 0.25%. It was not until mid-June 2004 that a gradual "normalization" of interest rates set in. Hence, it appears that the currency market was more sensitive to communications when interest rates were falling whereas the bond market responded more when interest rates began to rise. Arguably, as short-term interest rates approach the zero lower bound, more interventions on the currency market may be called for. However, this reading of the results is clouded by the lack of data Our results, derived from Swiss financial data, hint at three conclusions. First, a new result borne of our analysis is that speeches and interviews by central bank officials do provide important information to market participants. In line with previous research, we also find that monetary policy announcements have a significant impact on financial assets. Second, a significant market reaction is observable for the bond, equity and foreign currency markets. This result is important in several respects. It shows that market participants pay heed to this form of communication, through which central banks can convey information in a flexible way. Speeches and interviews complement monetary policy announcements in notifying market participants of past, current and future SNB decisions and economic conditions. Overall, they may effectively contribute to enhancing the transparency of a central bank authority. Third, using a new high-frequency database allowed us to accurately analyze market reactions to real-time communication. The bond market is the most responsive to public announcements, followed by the currency market, while the stock exchange is the least reactive. We attribute these diverse reaction patterns to the various relationships between monetary policy and discounted asset values. In this paper we have focused on the use of communication tools and the associated market reactions. Further research could be devoted to the content, the clarity, the length and complexity of central bank communication and its market effects. 2.77* 0.33 5.56** 9.77*** 7.12*** 3.51* 1.16 Var. F-test 601*** 1.27 24.89*** 11.72*** 16.2*** 2.54*** 5.33*** No unscheduled, no general meetings Anova F-stat 158*** 1.84 68.02*** 22.64*** 11.13*** 11.1*** 9.59*** Med. Chi-sq.
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